Germanwings

[markjay]

The failure here seems to be not with the operational procedures on-board or with regard to airplane control, but with the vetting process that the Co-Pilot went through.

We will have to wait to see if it was depression, mental illness or some other mechanism that triggered these actions, but frequent psychological testing may have helped prevent this disaster (and possibly MH370) more effectively than any on-board musical chairs routine.

Vetting, frequent evaluations, two people in the cockpit... it's sll about having several layers of safety.

 

[Dryce]

At any rate, it is clear that the chances of success for a would-be suicide pilot are much smaller if the pilot is NOT alone in the cockpit.

A tiny tiny bit smaller.

The aircraft doesn't have to take 8 minutes to reach the ground.

I would suggest that very few passengers realise how quickly an aircraft can be put into an effectively unrecoverable condition.

 

[grober]

The airline has had a long-standing dispute with the Vereinigung Cockpit union which has demanded a scheme in which pilots can retire at the age of 55 and retain 60% of their pay, which parent Lufthansa insists is no longer affordable. Germanwings pilots staged a nationwide strike in support of their demands in April 2014 which lasted 3 days. The pilots staged another 6 hours strike at the end of the Summer holidays in September 2014. Simultaneous strikes were staged by Lufthansa pilots.
By the end of 2014 all of Lufthansa's national routes and international traffic to and from Germany - except all flights to and from Frankfurt and Munich and both Lufthansa long-haul routes from Düsseldorf (to Newark and Chicago) - has been taken over by Germanwings. The last route that was handed over from Lufthansa to Germanwings was Düsseldorf-Zurich on 8 January 2015. This speaks to me of an airline under financial stress with aircrew industrial disputes like many other big national carriers before it. Whether this in any way would effect their training /vetting policy remains unclear.
Germanwings - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Bellow]

According to reports from USA the communication between the pilots was strained during the pre flight checks, a young pilot not a lot of flying hours why did this not trigger alarm bells and get flagged up for investigation. He was stopped from training because of psychiatric issues and his medical files reveal severe depression, who manages these people?

My question also. How the hell does a man with that on his mind go unnoticed?
While I have every sympathy for those with psychological issues, when the stakes are this high - it is time to re-examine attitudes to which occupations can be permitted to those so afflicted.

Egypt Air 990 - there is no evidence of a physical struggle in the cockpit, it seems that the first officer was pushing his stick down while the Captain was pulling his up.

It is not clear if the Captain realised that the first officer was deliberately trying to crash the plain, and it is not impossible that he would have managed to prevent the crash if he did try to physically overcome the first officer.

At any rate, it is clear that the chances of success for a would-be suicide pilot are much smaller if the pilot is NOT alone in the cockpit.

You have just made the absolute case for a minimum of three on the flight deck at any time.

 

[Deker]

That kind of defeats the original purpose of having two pilots onboard... i.e. that each pilot can fly the plane on his own if the other pilot is unwell or passes-out etc.

Maybe it should just take two keys to disable the autopilot, and in the event of a pilot being unavailable the second key can be remotely triggered from the ground.

 

[markjay]

Agreed, a suicidical pilot can switch-off the engines or cut the power to them in one swift move during take-off, and there would not be enough time for anyone in the cockpit to stop the inevitable crash.

But again safety is a statistical science. Each safety measure (when correctly applied) reduced the probability of an accident.

You could argue that some sefety measures are too expensive, or too complicated, or hinder other tasks, to justify taking when the risk is small, the outcome insignificant, or the reduction in probability is low.

In that context, I don't see the requirement to have the cockpit manned by two people at any time as unreasonable, expensive, or preventing the crew from carrying out their duties.

 

[markjay]

As for the statistical nature of safety...

Road cars are not required to have a roll-cage, and occupants are not required to wear crash helmets, i.e. in the same way that some track and race cars are, even though we know it would have saved lives on our roads.

We do require cars to have seatbelts and for occupants to wear them though.

The former is considered too impractical and awkward for use in road cars, the latter only a minor inconvenience.

Wearing a seatbelt in a road car represents good value as far as the conversion ratio between cost (in term of both money and convenience) and reduction of risk of injury goes, a roll-cage and helmet do not.

 

[Conquistador]

Anyone thought of putting a separate private toilet cubicle in the cockpit so the captain and FO need never have to leave the cockpit?

 

[Dryce]

Agreed, a suicidical pilot can switch-off the engines or cut the power to them in one swift move during take-off, and there would not be enough time for anyone in the cockpit to stop the inevitable crash.

For my part I wasn't thinking of the take off or landing phases.

An aircraft at cruise is rather more vulnerable than most people would imagine whether you mandate 2 people in the cockpit or not.

 

[Dryce]

Anyone thought of putting a separate private toilet cubicle in the cockpit so the captain and FO need never have to leave the cockpit?

That doesn't solve the problem because with one pilot in the en-suite the other can take the plane down.

Bear in mind that it doesn't need to be done by descending smoothly over 8 minutes.

 

[DSM10000]

Anyone thought of putting a separate private toilet cubicle in the cockpit so the captain and FO need never have to leave the cockpit?

Cockpits are not that spacious and regardless you could, if determined, place the aircraft into a situation that was probably non-recoverable and also turn the engines off in just a few seconds.

 

[grober]

Germanwings co-pilot Andreas Lubitz 'hid illness from employers' | World news | The Guardian

If true---- does pose the ethical question as to whether the medical professional who deemed him sufficiently ill to be signed off work should not have been under some statutory obligation to inform his employer of his fitness to fly at the same time ? While this touches on the doctor patient confidentiality question we are talking about someone entrusted with the lives of some 150 people in the air and possibly more on the ground where slightly different ethics " to the greater good" might apply.

 

[st13phil]

An aircraft at cruise is rather more vulnerable than most people would imagine whether you mandate 2 people in the cockpit or not.

This is the reality. You could have 22 people in the cockpit and someone at the controls could put an aircraft in cruise into an unrecoverable situation in seconds. The locked cockpit door is an obvious focus for the media, but the problem is not how many people present on the side with the controls.

 

[DSM10000]

I am unsure how German aviation authorities deal with such matters of confidentiality and illness but as an example in the UK in relation to driving:

If a medical practitioner has grounds to suspect that a patient's medical condition may adversely affect their ability to safely operate a motor vehicle and the patient refuses to abide by the advice to not drive or is incapable of understanding that advice then then this can be reported to the DVLA and in these circumstances the General Medical Council do suggest that the confidentiality of the patient may be breached but it is a very difficult process that often has difficult and traumatic repercussions for the
relationship between practitioner and patient.

From the guidelines:


"It is the duty of the licence holder or licence applicant to notify DVLA of any medical condition, which may affect safe driving. On occasions however, there are circumstances in which the licence holder cannot, or will not do so.
The GMC has issued clear guidelines* applicable to such circumstances, which state:

1. The driver is legally responsible for informing the DVLA about such a condition or treatment. However, if a patient has such a condition, you should explain to the patient:

(a) that the condition may affect their ability to drive (if the patient is incapable of understanding this advice, for example, because of dementia, you should inform the DVLA immediately), and
(b) that they have a legal duty to inform the DVLA about the condition.

1. If a patient refuses to accept the diagnosis, or the effect of the condition on their ability to drive, you can suggest that they seek a second opinion, and help arrange for them to do so. You should advise the patient not to drive in the meantime.
2. If a patient continues to drive when they may not be fit to do so, you should make every reasonable effort to persuade them to stop. As long as the patient agrees, you may discuss your concerns with their relatives, friends or carers.
3. If you do not manage to persuade the patient to stop driving, or you discover that they are continuing to drive against your advice, you should contact the DVLA immediately and disclose any relevant medical information, in confidence, to the medical adviser.
4. Before contacting the DVLA you should try to inform the patient of your decision to disclose personal information. You should then also inform the patient in writing once you have done so."

A similar scenario would also apply to a pilot if you thought that they were medically unfit to fly, assuming of course that the patient had been truthful regarding their occupation!

If it was a mandatory CAA medical examination then the process is a great deal easier.

 

[markjay]

This is the reality. You could have 22 people in the cockpit and someone at the controls could put an aircraft in cruise into an unrecoverable situation in seconds. The locked cockpit door is an obvious focus for the media, but the problem is not how many people present on the side with the controls.

You could equally argue that there is no point in putting any security measures in place in banks because evidently they are still getting robbed from time to time...

And in the same way you lock your front door when you leave the house even though you know that a determined burger can knock it down with a large hammer, you want to implement as many measures as possible that will make it difficult - though not impossible - for such events to take place.

Safety and security are all about probability. Make the undesirable event more difficult and less likely. That is all. Will having two people in the cockpit prevent pilots from committing suicide? No. Will it make it more difficult for a pilot to commit suicide? Yes. What is the cost? Nil. That's the question and the answer in one go...

 

[BTB 500]

You could have 22 people in the cockpit and someone at the controls could put an aircraft in cruise into an unrecoverable situation in seconds.

Is that really the case with a fly-by-wire airliner like the A320, at cruising altitude?

 

[DSM10000]

Is that really the case with a fly-by-wire airliner like the A320, at cruising altitude?

Pull both engine off switches and at cruising altitude the engines will not re-light, you would need to descend, usually below 30,000 ft to allow a successful re-start, possibly trigger the engine fire extinguishers rendering them incapable of a re-start. Or kill one engine and out the other at maximum thrust, the aircraft would roll and dive without pilot input.

That followed by violent command input could easily destabilise an aircraft.

 

[markjay]

Is that really the case with a fly-by-wire airliner like the A320, at cruising altitude?

I think it is very difficult to put any modern fixed-wing aircraft into an unrecoverable position at 38,000 feet... unless it suffers some sort of malfunction of course.

Keeping in mind that the definition of 'unrecoverable' is that no pilot input can recover the plane. The reality is that most crashes occurred because of a combination of issues and circumstances that may or may not have been known to the pilot at the time, but in hindsight it was possible to recover in a simulator.

At this height, even a stall or a spin are potentially recoverable with the correct manoeuvre.

In fact I struggle to think on a case when a perfectly fit passenger aircraft flying in that altitude in good weather managed to get into an unrecoverable position?

The idea is that as long as you have enough altitude and can put the nose down to gain airspeed on the wing, you can recover.

You could of course lose height and once flying low do all sort of things.

 

[markjay]

Pull both engine off switches and at cruising altitude the engines will not re-light, you would need to descend, usually below 30,000 ft to allow a successful re-start, possibly trigger the engine fire extinguishers rendering them incapable of a re-start. Or kill one engine and out the other at maximum thrust, the aircraft would roll and dive without pilot input.

That followed by violent command input could easily destabilise an aircraft.

Yes, but it is not 'unrecoverable' though.

 

[Dryce]

You could equally argue that there is no point in putting any security measures in place in banks because evidently they are still getting robbed from time to time...

Actually this exactly correct as regards *new or incremental* security measures.

And in the same way you lock your front door when you leave the house even though you know that a determined burger can knock it down with a large hammer, you want to implement as many measures as possible that will make it difficult - though not impossible - for such events to take place.

Again. We have windows that are easily broken.

And in fact double glazing is an example of where there was a safety issue raised - windows less easy to break - therfore more difficult to use as an emergency exit route.

Safety and security are all about probability.

It's also about cost and outcomes.

Flying is riskier than people think. The industry is incredibly good at managing the risk - mainly through *conservative* refinement of culture, procedure, and technology.

The biggest risk today is probably pilot error or behaviour. Not because pilots are inherently unsafe but because other aspects have been smoothed over so well.

There are ways to deal with this - but because the risks involving pilots are so low any time you change the culture or procedure then for marginal effect you risk a new marginal exposure.

The *logical* way ahead is obviously to remove pilots.

But this is like the MB SBC issue. People notice the warning messages and they occasionally hear about actual failures. They don't hear about the occasions where the SBC system performed better than an ordinary braking system and protected the occupants from a worse outcome than might have otherwise been expected. So it's difficult to form a fully rounded assessmenrt.

So we hear about pilot errors. We don't hear about the times that a minor bit of good thinking avoided the start of a chain of events leading to catastrophe.

The impression in the media at the moment is that this was avoidable not because of cockpit manning procedures but medical screening.

That kind of indicates where the first focus should be. Basically if the pilot is a complex critical component in the control system then focus on ways of making sure you don't use faulty ones.