TANKS for the memories

[grober]

Too big, too heavy, too late? The Poles don't think so.

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[markjay]

The issue with conventional war (between two regular armies) is that ultimately you need to take and hold territory.

ICBMs, nukes, guided missiles, attack drones, stealth fighter jets and bombers (and even cyber warfare) can all help to achieve this goal, but none of them can take and occupy enemy territory (unless you use disproportionate overwhelming power, e.g. nuking Japan in WW2).

And so, in spite of all the technologal advances, the only way to make territorial gain is via heavy battle tanks, supported by mechanised infantry on foot and in APCs.

No country that expects a confrontation with another country's regular army can be without tanks, infantry, and APCs. Just like in WW2, BTW - not much has changes strategically.

(Obviously, it's a very different picture when it comes to asymmetric war, I.e. against irregulars or insurgents or terrorists etc)

 

[grober]

Some footage of the US main battle tank Abrams M1A2 in action ---BUT reminds us that in certain conflict environments missile carrying Attack Helicopters may pose a real theat to battle field supremacy of older tank designs particularly in their aspects of deployment and re-supply.- and aircover is one combat aspect the UKRAINE seems to lack? What they don't lack of course is their willingness to fight!

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dealt with here

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[DITTRICH]

UK promises:-

14 Challenger 2 tanks
30 self-propelled AS90 guns

The high variation in the types of assets, the ammunition, and the long supply/repair lines...

Excerpt from Zaluzhny interview with the Economist: “I know I can defeat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 BMP, 500 howitzers. Then, I think, it is absolutely possible to cross the border on February 23″

There seems to be a sense that if the resources are not forthcoming (to replenish losses) then any counter offensive is wishful thinking.

Given the large Ukrainian mobilisations, and apparent losses of men and equipment, will they have enough personnel to train and maintain these additional assets?

 

[markjay]

At the height of the Cold War, western countries adapted small commercial helicopters to carrying anti-tank missiles (MD 500 Defender, Bölkow MBB Bo 105, Aérospatiale Gazelle, etc), as well as developing new military helicopters with similar anti-tank attack capabilities (Bell AH-1 Cobra), with the (almost) sole purpose of stopping an armoured invasion by the Soviet army westward into Europe. However, military planners were well aware that while small nimble attack helicopters that can hide behind terrain or threes and ambush an invading armoured column cam slow down or even stop completely a Soviet invasion, these helicopters would not be able to capture enemy territory or push back the invader and retake own previously-captured ground. The aim of the attack helicopters was mainly to provide a quick deployment of a rapid response force over a wide front, that can hold back the invading tanks until the Western countries' own tank regiments could me mobilised and moved to the front to meet the enemy tanks head to head.

 

[markjay]

Incidentally, all Western countries now have anti-missile protection for their own tanks (something that the Russians do not seem to have, or, at any rate, do not have on the tanks deployed in Ukraine).

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[DITTRICH]

At the height of the Cold War, western countries adapted small commercial helicopters to carrying anti-tank missiles (MD 500 Defender, Bölkow MBB Bo 105, Aérospatiale Gazelle, etc), as well as developing new military helicopters with similar anti-tank attack capabilities (Bell AH-1 Cobra), with the (almost) sole purpose of stopping an armoured invasion by the Soviet army westward into Europe. However, military planners were well aware that while small nimble attack helicopters that can hide behind terrain or threes and ambush an invading armoured column cam slow down or even stop completely a Soviet invasion, these helicopters would not be able to capture enemy territory or push back the invader and retake own previously-captured ground. The aim of the attack helicopters was mainly to provide a quick deployment of a rapid response force over a wide front, that can hold back the invading tanks until the Western countries' own tank regiments could me mobilised and moved to the front to meet the enemy tanks head to head.

Interesting history. Did Zaluzhny miss helicopters off the list?

 

[markjay]

Interesting history. Did Zaluzhny miss helicopters off the list?

Attack helicopters no longer play a key role in stopping invading armoured columns, not in the same way they used to, anyway. Firstly, we now have very efficient man-portable anti-tank missile systems, allowing rapid deployment of small units of 2-3 soldiers behind eneny lines or next to major routes. This is a concept that the Soviets actually refined after WW2, initially with the very successful RPG-7, then with guided missiles i.e. the 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) and later the 9M133 Kornet. The West obviously has its own modern anti-tank guided missile systems. Then, we now use attack drones to deliver anti-tank missiles, they are much cheaper, smaller and quieter, and there's no need to risk the lives of the pilots. And last, as for Ukraine, we need to keep in mind that the original Cold War era brief was to stop a Soviet invasion across a border consisting of thousands of miles of plains and forests, and so rapid response and mobility of the defending force were key. I am not sure that the Russian incursions into Ukraine's Eastern front require such a highly mobile solution, especially given the cost and the requirements in terms of training and maintenance etc (Plus, the Americans might not be very happy if the Russians captured an Apache helicopter equipped with the latest weapon systems including FLIR etc).

 

[grober]

Attack helicopters no longer play a key role in stopping invading armoured columns, not in the same way they used to, anyway. Firstly, we now have very efficient man-portable anti-tank missile systems, allowing rapid deployment of small units of 2-3 soldiers behind eneny lines or next to major routes. This is a concept that the Soviets actually refined after WW2, initially with the very successful RPG-7, then with guided missiles i.e. the 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) and later the 9M133 Kornet. The West obviously has its own modern anti-tank guided missile systems. Then, we now use attack drones to deliver anti-tank missiles, they are much cheaper, smaller and quieter, and there's no need to risk the lives of the pilots. And last, as for Ukraine, we need to keep in mind that the original Cold War era brief was to stop a Soviet invasion across a border consisting of thousands of miles of plains and forests, and so rapid response and mobility of the defending force were key. I am not sure that the Russian incursions into Ukraine's Eastern front require such a highly mobile solution, especially given the cost and the requirements in terms of training and maintenance etc (Plus, the Americans might not be very happy if the Russians captured an Apache helicopter equipped with the latest weapon systems including FLIR etc).

That touches on the dilemma of the Ukraine conflict for the Western powers, who are understandably reluctant to commit their latest defence hardware to a non-NATO member. TREATY wise they may even disbarred from doing so. So the Ukrainians get just enough military technology to keep the Russians at bay but no more. This may lead to a toxic conflict stagnation as each side makes a little ground militarily until the opposition is fed better hardware by their opposing major power and the situation is reversed again.
I doubt for example that the 14 UK supplied Challenger tanks represent the latest version the battle tank in terms of reactive armour/anti missile/targeting/communication technology but who knows?--the Ukranians are savvy enough not to look a gift horse in the mouth too closely.

 

[Dryce]

There seems to be a sense that if the resources are not forthcoming (to replenish losses) then any counter offensive is wishful thinking.

That seems to be the long and short of it.

Russia is several times bigger than Ukraine and is ruled by a murderous despot willing to spill his own army's blood in quantity.

But Ukraine has significantly more useful friends

 

[Dryce]

I doubt for example that the 14 UK supplied Challenger tanks represent the latest version the battle tank in terms of reactive armour/anti missile/targeting/communication technology but who knows?--the Ukranians are savvy enough not to look a gift horse in the mouth too closely.

Challenger 2 is ..... 25 years old.

When I saw the number I was left thinking it was a symbolic offer. 14 seems to offer up the complexity and heavy kit in a force size that would support training but not actual deployment. At least 50 or 60 would seem like a more practical proposition.

 

[grober]

(S+) Krieg in der Ukraine: Deutschland schickt Leopard-Panzer

Nach monatelanger Debatte hat sich Kanzler Scholz durchgerungen, Kampfpanzer an die Ukraine zu liefern. Auch die Verbündeten wollen offenbar mitziehen. Aus den USA könnten Abrams-Panzer kommen.

www-spiegel-de.translate.goog

 

[grober]

WSJ News Exclusive | U.S. Leans Toward Providing Abrams Tanks to Ukraine

An announcement of tank deliveries could come this week, U.S. officials said, part of an understanding with Germany in which Berlin would agree to send its own Leopard 2 tanks.

www.wsj.com

 

[E55BOF]

Challenger 2 is ..... 25 years old.

When I saw the number I was left thinking it was a symbolic offer. 14 seems to offer up the complexity and heavy kit in a force size that would support training but not actual deployment. At least 50 or 60 would seem like a more practical proposition.

The most modern tank the Russians can deploy is the T-90; they are thought to have some 200. The T-90 was introduced in 1990, 23 years ago.

The Challenger offer is indeed symbolic, and it has worked; Leopards will soon be available in quantity to Ukraine.

 

[markjay]

My understanding is that the Ukrainian army has hundreds of armoured vehicles, including tanks, that were abandoned by fleeing Russian troops, but they are mostly old T-72 tanks without advanced fire control systems etc.

 

[Dryce]

My understanding is that the Ukrainian army has hundreds of armoured vehicles, including tanks, that were abandoned by fleeing Russian troops, but they are mostly old T-72 tanks without advanced fire control systems etc.

The T-72 is about 42 tonnes. Crew of 3. The western tanks are 55 to 65 tonnes. Crew of 4. Some T-72s will have upgrades systems - some won't.

But the weight difference sort of tells the story here. And while heavy these large tanks are suprisingly mobile because they have high performance power plants.

Where these become significant is probably in two areas:

- they potentially give the Ukrainians the potential to concentrate this armoured weight and mobility and break the static defence lines.

- or to use in small groups to act as an active defence against the momentum of any mobile break through of their own lines. This is important because of the lack of airpower.

While the emphasis in the media ends to be on the former - I would suspect that the professionals looking on the situation from offices in Washington or Berlin or London or Warsaw are thinking more about the latter use as a defence against the Russians building up and trying to use weight of numbers to break through in the spring.

When these sorts of tanks were first being spec'ed up in the 80s the job they were envisaged for would have been to wear down mass forces of Soviet T-72s and T-80s advancing from the east - inflicting losses and slowing down the advance then using their mobility to break off and then reorganise to repeat the process.

 

[Williamwoo]

The most modern tank the Russians can deploy is the T-90; they are thought to have some 200. The T-90 was introduced in 1990, 23 years ago.

Think you'll find that's 33 years ago!

 

[E55BOF]

So it was. Reinforces my point, too.

 

[markjay]

The main weakness of the T-72 is the omission of the forth crew member (loader) and the introduction of the autoloader mechanism that necessitates the shells to be stored inside the crew compartment, reducing their survivability. This also explains why so many damaged T-72 tanks are missing their turrets (and just consider the force of the explosion that sends the 12 ton turret flying in the air, there's no way the crew can survive it).

This video explains well why the Russian tanks failed in Ukraine:

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[Dryce]

The main weakness of the T-72 is the omission of the forth crew member (loader) and the introduction of the autoloader mechanism that necessitates the shells to be stored inside the crew compartment, reducing their survivability.

The Soviet designers went with the autoloader in the T-64.

At the time this made sense making the tank physically compact a more difficult target to hit and reducing crewing requirements. That arguably would have seen as increasing survivability (less likely to be hit and fewer crew to be lost in the event of the tank being hit). So the T-72 designers took this route.

The west diverged and went with better protection if the vehicle was hit (larger vehicle, more armour, more technogically advanced armour). And the fourth crew member was seen as benefitting field maintenance and reliabiolity/availability.

If you want to see a different compromise that was designed to take on hordes of T-64s and T-72s look at the Swedish S-Tank. About the same weight as a T-72, an autoloader, but four crew, and turretless.